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Abstract
This paper describes a rule based system that has been designed to oversee the
maneuvering of the autonomous underwater vehicle, AUV II, that has been con-
structed at the Naval Postgraduate School. The system will monitor the progress
from the AUV launch point to a goal area and back to the origin. It is able to make
informed decisions about the mission, taking into account the navigational path,
the vehicle subsystems health, the sea environment, and the specific mission profile
which is downloaded from an offboard mission planner. Heuristics for maneuvering,
avoidance of uncharted obstacles, waypoint navigation, and reaction to emergen-
cies - essentially the expert knowledge of a submarine captain - have been coded
using the expert system shell CLIPS. The design of a high level control software
architecture for AUV II and the development of the domain specific knowledge for
AUV operation are discussed in detail. Simulation results showed that the system
is capable of reacting to various adverse situations in a timely manner.
1 Introduction
For decades, the development of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV's) has been an
ambition for industries and the government alike. Only recently, however, have practical
AUV's appeared to be reality. Several marine autonomous and remotely-piloted vehicles
are currently in use for such diverse functions as underwater inspection [9], offshore oil
exploitation [4], and hydrography [13]. The practical advantage of low-risk to human
operators coupled with the potential ability to operate at over-the-horizon distances
make autonomous underwater vehicles highly desirable for many subsea activities and
operations.
The Naval Postgraduate School has been investigating AUV technologies involving
vehicle dynamics and control, artificial intelligence, robotics, and computer architec-
tures. An experimental testbed, AUV II, has been designed, fabricated, and successfully
launched on site [7]. As noted in [15], the technologies that are essential to AUV success
include navigation, composite hull materials, guidance, energy source, propulsion, com-
munication links, and signal processing as well as the specific mission packages. To make
an AUV truly adaptive and survivable, however, an advanced decision making capability
is also needed. Our current efforts attempt to take the development of an intelligent
control system for AUV II into the next increment of evolution, beyond the primitive
closed-loop control. The project focuses on software modules in two different levels: the
intermediate level modules, such as pattern recognition and navigation, and high level
modules, such as mission planning/replanning and mission execution.
This paper describes the design and development results of a mission executor which is
responsible for high level control of AUV II. The purpose is to provide a control system
for the vehicle so that it will adequately emulate the human-machine interaction that
regularly takes place on manned submersibles.
1.1 The Need for a Mission Execution Expert System
One general software architecture for AUV is a top-down flow of control ranging from
strategic level control through tactical level to hardware interface level. Higher levels of
abstraction perform some of the activities (some time-sensitive) which require measured
decision-making.
The control structure of AUV II has undergone an evolutionary development. Ini-
tially, it was essentially low level closed-loop control. Incremental enhancements to the
AUV functionalities necessitated the incorporation of an expert system to integrate and
coordinate intelligent activities such as system monitoring, waypoint following, and ob-
stacle avoidance. As the autonomous vehicle enters the real underwater environment, it
must perform independently all kinds of tasks required to complete its mission. Although
routine situations can be handled in an algorithmic manner, many incidental problems
need to be resolved relying on heuristics. This type of problem solving requires high
level reasoning and decision making, often in real-time, and in an environment of uncer-
tainty or incomplete knowledge. The primary goal of the Mission Executor was to design
heuristics that make it possible for the system to deal with extensions of well-known
problems.
1.2 Requirements of a Mission Executor
The Mission Executor, in the broadest sense, must be able to safely control movement
between a mission starting point and a mission goal. In doing so, it must operate between
three models: that of the vehicle world, the environmental world, and the mission world.
To supervise the vehicle world implies that the Mission Executor must monitor and
control vehicle "health" such as battery state, internal system pressure, and temperature.
It must also be able to respond to a deteriorating condition of the vehicle sonar, navigation
system, or guidance systems. The loss of a major onboard instrument, such as the sonar
or navigation system, would probably be catastrophic in many cases and would result
in a mission degradation in the least serious case. The Mission Executor must supervise
the subsystem recovery procedure or make decisions that can circumvent the problem.
Should that fail it must make a strategic level decision to abort the mission.
Control of the vehicle in the context of the environmental world means reaction
to topological features such as undersea terrain and obstacles (both moving and non-
moving), a significant change in atmospheric conditions, or any external threat which
would physically hinder the vehicle from making the transit to the goal point.
Monitoring of the mission world entails recognizing transition points between handling
normal transit and beginning a special mission profile. Possible speed and depth changes,
special requirements for inshore navigation, and deployment of any equipment must be
considered. Most important, the mission priority must be readjusted for vehicle survival
and reusability. Heuristics for this must be incorporated in the software.
1.3 Organization of the Paper
Section 2 is a survey of related work on AUV control systems and related technology.
Section 3 describes information processing onboard the AUV II. It details the interactions
between various modules of the AUV II software architecture. Section 4 presents the
design of the Mission Executor. Section 5 provides a description of the implementation
of the Mission Executor. Issues on the proper combination of rules and objects, the role of
uncertainty and truth maintenance are also discussed in the context of AUV operations.
Section 6 presents simulation results. Section 7 outlines contributions, conclusions, and
extensions for further work.
2 Related Work
Layered control architecture [3] is behavior-oriented, using the subsumption approach:
low-order behaviors are first installed and verified in the testbed, and when satisfactory
performance is achieved, the next level of complex behaviors is then added. The lower
level is subsumed by the higher level. Other studies that employ some form of the layered
architecture include: (1) state configured layered control [1] which addresses the issue
of mission specific behavior coordination; (2) the ARCS underwater vehicles [19], which
also incorporate rule based heuristics and learning through reflexive behaviors, logical
behaviors, and learned behaviors; (3) the TASC/NUSC architecture [17] which com-
bines aspects of real-time layering, functional decomposition and subsumption; and (4)
KB/EAVE [2], which is knowledge-based AUV software that accomplishes its functions
through functional layering.
In the hierarchical structure approach, the software is usually divided hierarchically
into interrelated levels of functional units such as the planner, navigator, pilot, and
actuator/controller [8]. Each level has its own separate sensor bank for perception, a
map for world model reasoning, and a reporter for intelligent control. The functional
unit itself has its own database, rule base, and evaluator. Software for Autonomous
Control of ROV90 [16] is also a hierarchical system in which a monitoring unit, the
Watchdog, supervises several lower level modules that perform the functions of mission
sequencing, navigation, vehicle control, and error checking.
The Exception Handling Model [14], constructed as a procedural expert system, func-
tions as a mission executor for an industrial robot. It attempts to achieve the planned
behavior and provides a series of prioritized strategies for recovery. The strategies are
encoded in heuristics around the general functions of monitoring, diagnosis, and response
in a loose hierarchy.
3 Onboard Information Processing
While the AUV II software contains over a dozen modules [7], only four of them directly
interact with the Mission Executor. The interface between these modules and the klission
Executor is depicted in Figure 1. Each of the modules and the data transmitted between
the modules are discussed in the following sections.
High Level
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Figure 1: The Interface
3.1 Downloading Mission Profile from the Mission Planner
Given mission requirements and relevant environment information, the offboard Mission
Planner provides AUV II with initial instructions to carry out the mission. These include
the best three dimensional operation path to the goal, time requirements, and special
path constraints [11]. The Mission Executor's most important functions in a normal
transit are to receive waypoints and command data (denoted as a path) from the Mission
Planner, to interpret the movements, to convert path postures to reference postures, and
to properly sequence and monitor the movements. The other important functions which
the Mission Executor carries out axe generally exception-handling relative to normal
operations.
The Mission Executor's role in interacting with the Mission Planner should not be
categorized as simply a conversion unit serving a high-level planner. The Mission Execu-
tor must reason about waypoints and their associated speeds. If the original commanded
speed for a particular waypoint is not feasible due to an unplanned deviation from course,
then the Mission Executor must call the Navigation module for an updated speed to reach
the goal on time. It may also request the onboard Mission RePlanner to replan the mis-
sion should the original path be no longer valid.
3.2 Updating World Model with the Obstacle Checker
Conceptually, the Obstacle Checker has the responsibility of processing packaged sensor
data transmitted from the sonar module and relating it to specific obstacles. Both the
type of obstacles (moving or stationary) and the avoidance maneuver (decrease-speed,
increase-speed, dive, ascend, or stop) are determined and passed to the Mission Execu-
tor. The data passed include an obstacle alert-and-direction flag followed by a template
containing the following information: obstacle identification, relative distance, relative
orientation, time, movement, and parameters of movement.
The direction flag is sent merely to alert the Mission Executor for a real-time re-
port. Receipt of the template data allows the Executor to call the RePlanner with the
information. The Executor also flags Guidance to be ready for imminent receipt of re-
vised reference postures for the new path-to-goal referenced to the current geographical
position. A low-level reflexive response can also be passed directly to the guidance con-
troller, thereby bypassing the Mission Executor in the case of an unplanned obstacle close
aboard.
3.3 Requesting Replanning
The RePlanner, a knowledge based path planner that uses an optimized real-time A*
search [10], attempts to plan a new path-to-goal based on knowledge of the goal state,
the current geographical location, and special path constraints passed by the Executor.
It operates in four dimensions: three standard cartesian dimensions and a fourth di-
mension of heading or azimuth [12]. The RePlanner receives periodic updates from the
environmental database, allowing it to replan the new route from any specified origin.
The RePlanner is alerted to the need to replan by a function call from the Executor.
A flag and the coordinates of the current location are transferred to the RePlanner. It
constructs a new plan in the same manner as the Planner does, using a priori knowledge
of the environment. A file of new waypoints is returned to the Mission Executor when
replanning is completed.
3.4 Guarding Vehicle Health with Systems Monitor
The vehicle's internal world is modeled as a set of sensor objects which measures the
subsystem components, including power sources such as an array of batteries for sub-
system power and propulsion support, control system indicators for rudders, planes and
propellers, sonar power status indicators for four onboard sonars, onboard computer
temperature sensors, navigation instrument fault sensors, and power sources for environ-
mental sensors. These have default guard-line and red-line ranges which, when violated,
cause an alarm to be sent to the decision making levels. An automated turn-key opera-
tion is first generated which attempts to recover from an equipment failure or impending
failure by bringing a redundant system on-line, if such redundancy is provided. If the
equipment is critical, it may degrade the vehicle condition or even abort the mission.
3.5 The Guidance Subsystem
The end results of the Mission Executor functions must be a series of reference postures
and commands to the Guidance subsystem. Guidance is an intermediate level function
which has an algorithmic reasoning system. It converts high level decisions and reference
postures to low level commanded postures for the Autopilot module. A function call
within the rules of the Mission Executor generates an alert to the Guidance module to
prepare for receipt of data and commands.
4 Design of the Mission Executor
This section describes the design of the Mission Executor, interface limitations, and
the software constructs used. This design is intended to cover most situations of AUV
operations.
4.1 Reasoning about Several Worlds
The Mission Executor attempts to serve the role of high level director while integrating
decisions on the basis of input from the vehicle internal systems, the external environ-
ment, and the mission plan. It continuously assesses whether a mission can be carried
out successfully, the ultimate goal. Decisions are modeled heuristically rather than in a
strictly algorithmic fashion, based primarily on the status of low level events. In other
words, low level events drive broader decisions. The requirement to model this lends
itself naturally to a hierarchical design, but one that is priority-situation based.
Basic AUV guidance or control systems are closed-loop and are adequate to handle
routine maneuvering. The Mission Executor exists mainly to deal with exceptions to
normal maneuvering which cannot be processed in a strictly algorithmic manner. Its
reasoning results in interrupt commands to the Guidance subsystem (which in turn con-
trols the Autopilot). If there are no deviations from the track caused by any of the three
worlds that AUV must deal with, then the Mission Executor merely fulfills the role of
sequencer of data.
Although not all experiential knowledge may be encoded in rules, there is reason
to believe that AUV missions can be bounded. Some previous research has suggested
that AUV behaviors can in fact be standardized. For example, typical situations in
which an AUV might find itself have been identified in [18] in which the "Generalized
Problem vs Contingency Alternatives Matrix" provides a set of possible problems and
alternative actions an AUV can take to overcome the problems. Problems are classified
into three categories: mission, environment, and internal failures. These have one-to-one
correspondence with the three worlds that the Mission Executor tries to model.
This view of high level control as essentially handling exceptions to normal transit
and operations is embodied in the Mission Executor. Some of the implications of the
matrix merit serious consideration while others are simply beyond the scope of current
technology. For example, vehicle self-repair is highly unlikely in a mechanical failure
situation unless this term refers only to equipment which has a redundant system or
power source available.
4.2 The Structure
The Mission Executor consists of a knowledge base of rules, facts, and objects. Figure 2
shows the overall structure and data flows of the Mission Executor. A set of rules exists
for the Mission Executive and for each functional (i.e., situational) area: maneuvering,
navigation, subsystem-monitoring, environmental hazard, and specialized mission. The
rules interact with the object base and cache of facts to produce guidance commands.
The Mission Executor was designed based on the overall state of the mission existing
in one of three forms: continue_un restricted, continue_with_restrictions, or abort_mission. If
no deviations occur during the course of the mission, the mission status remains at its
default status, continue.un restricted. It views each functional area in two levels: critical
and failure. The critical level indicates that a functional area has suffered some sort
of restrictive, non-catastrophic loss of capability. This can be on the order of loss of
non-mission essential equipment or a temporary maneuvering restriction such as obstacle
avoidance which takes it away from its principal direction of travel. This results in the
mission status of continue.with_restrictions. The mission restriction category can later be
lifted if the vehicle recovers in ample time. If not, the mission restriction remains, or
the overall mission status worsens to abort.mission. The failure level indicates that the
functional area has suffered a major loss of capability such as loss of mission-essential
equipment or inability to maneuver. This essentially results in the status of abort_mission.
Each of the functional areas has a hierarchy among its rules. A functional assessor




























Figure 2: The structure of the Mission Executor
functional area information is then passed to the Mission Executive and causes top level
decision rules to be fired.
4.2.1 The Mission Executive
The Mission Executive performs the highest level of reasoning in the Mission Execu-
tor and consists of three major components: MissionJnterpreter, MissionJvlonitor, and
Overall_Mission^ssessor. The MissionJnterpreter receives mission plans from the offboard
Mission Planner and provides instructions to cany out the mission. The Mission.Monitor
is in charge of routine background functions such as the sequencing of the mission timer
and the continuous loop that queries the environmental sensors and the internal vehicle
subsystems. The 0verallJv1ission_Assessor is responsible mainly for tabulating the results
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sent by the functional area assessors. It is insulated from details of the reports by the
functional area supervisors.
If the AUV enters the status of abort.mission, the Mission Executive will request
the vehicle path to be replanned for a pre-planned rendezvous point. It may be the
origin of the mission or an intermediate point which facilitates recovery by the launching
platform. The status of continue_with_restrictions allows the vehicle to try to recover from
its maneuvering, navigation, or equipment restrictions.
The rules in the Mission Executive are given the highest priority for execution. It
is necessary to differentiate between a high-level, less frequent action and a lower-level,
frequently performed action. This is because a situation (pattern match) which may
cause an abort_mission or continue.with.restriction usually requires immediate or timely
reaction and certainly takes precedence over a routine action such as a normal turn
or depth-change. The emergency-action rule must be fired prior to other semantically
lower-priority rules on the agenda. This heuristically models a submarine commander's
"situational awareness" in an emergency. It might also be likened to the focus of attention
approach, such as that modeled in [2].
Last, but not least, the Mission Executive must send reference postures as well as
commands to the Guidance module. Many of the commands must initiate low level
actions with real-time constraints while the assessment of a particular functional area
status is in progress. The commands must be a series of well-understood actions which
will place the vehicle in a safe configuration when a casualty occurs. Table 1 shows the
commands currently implemented.
4.2.2 The Rule Base
The sequence of control in a rule-based system often contains a relatively high degree of
non-detenninism because of its declarative nature. While there are certain tasks which
must be accomplished in procedural order, the Mission Executor is a system that reasons
about situations which are normally beyond a closed-loop control system. Below we
discuss the characteristics of major rules in each functional area.
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Table 1: Possible commands to the Guidance module
Basic Maneuver Order Target of Order
turn turn left rudder
turn turn right rudder
depth change ascend XX planes
depth change dive XX planes
depth change surface planes
speed change increase speed drive motors
speed change decrease speed drive motors
speed change stop drive motors
speed change hover hover thrusters
XX = depth in inches or an indicated safe depth variable
Maneuvering Rules Maneuvering rules cover several situations. First and foremost
is obstacle avoidance. The highest priority rules cover emergency situations such as
detection of an obstacle close aboard. Various orientations of the obstacle relative to the
AUV's heading will prompt a right or left turn, an ascent or a full stop (drive motors
stopped) or a combination of these. These are heuristic turning rules which can produce
an effective gross avoidance for the AUV so that the RePlanner can then be invoked for
further path refinement. Table 2, based on [5], shows the avoidance heuristics currently
employed.
Table 2: Obstacle avoidance heuristics









Alert Flag is a four-bit signal generated by the Obstacle Checker. They represent the
information collected from the four sonars (forward, right, left, and bottom) installed on
AUV II. For each bit, a means that no obstacle is detected by that sonar, a 1 signals
detection, an X can be either 1 or (meaning the value is not important in determining
maneuvering). For example, the alert flag 1010 (second line from bottom in the table)
indicates that obstacles are detected by the forward and left sonars; therefore, the AUV
should make a right turn to avoid collision.
Detection of an obstacle at the range of the sonar's limits is another function covered
by the maneuvering rules. Because of the relatively limited distance of the AUV sonar,
avoidance action must be taken early. An obstacle is initially checked for its potential to
hazard the AUV, dependent on the obstacle's bearing drift and its relative bearing. This
is recorded and a collective obstacle heuristic is triggered to determine whether a propor-
tional amount of the obstacle will block the AUV to the left or right. A gross avoidance
maneuver is then commanded to bring the AUV away from the obstacle and allow the
RePlanner to plan the new avoidance path with appropriate mapping waypoints.
The procedures for creating an update to an obstacle are essentially the same. If the
obstacle is still a hazard, then further avoidance and replanning are necessary. There is
a chance that this will result in a significant deviation from the path and, eventually,
a mission abort. On the other hand, if the obstacle is no longer a danger, then its
collision danger is recorded as such and thus it is not considered in the collective obstacle
assessment.
Other rules in the maneuvering functional area cover special depth-changing evolu-
tions such as diving, ascents, and surfacing. The control systems have an inherently
large influence on these special maneuvers. If a control system fails during one of these
situation, that results in an automatically commanded maneuver to the Guidance to
correct the altitude and level the vessel at a safe depth or change the speed at which the
maneuver is proceeding. An improper obstacle clearance can also precipitate changing
one of these special evolutions.
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Navigation Rules The lower level action attribute of the configuration actually is
instantiated within the Navigation rules upon the occasion of waypoint arrival. The
rule that plays a significant part in the navigational aspect of high level control is the
assessment of progress along the mission track. The rule makes a simple comparison of
overall distance along the track with current location. It then orders a replan of the
current track if the current speed and progress made are not compatible with reaching
the goal area on time. A very simple energy-consideration function checks whether there
is sufficient propulsive power to get to the goal.
Other navigation rules cover specially-monitored depths: both yellow-depth and red-
depth. If the depth sonar indicates that the AUV has encountered a yellow depth area,
the AUV calls the Navigator for a check of the required depth in that area. If the observed
depth does not match the required depth, the Guidance is ordered to reverse course and
the RePlanner is called. If a red-depth violation is indicated, the Guidance is called to
reverse course.
System Monitor Rules Not only a large influence for its own functional area, the
overall equipment status exerts a notable influence in other areas. Separate rules exist for
each equipment area (sonar, control system, navigation instrument, environmental sensor,
and special mission equipment) and the respective power source. A continuous monitoring
rule polls each equipment area for equipments which are out of normal operating limits.
These limits are normally parameters of sustenance such as potential in volts or power
in watts. If a piece of mission essential equipment fails, it causes a failure in both the
equipment status area and in the area with which it is associated. For example, loss of
the diving-plane controls causes a maneuvering loss and a mission essential equipment
loss. If an auxiliary power source exists for the equipment, it can be used in the event
that the normal source fails. Similarly, equipment with redundancy has the capability to
have its functions shifted to the alternate should it fail.
The Equipment Status Assessor awaits the results of equipment polling. If a piece
of equipment fails, it will cause its classification rule to fire and the Equipment Status
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Assessor will tabulate the results. If some mission-essential equipment or a sufficient
number of non-mission-essential equipment fails, the equipment status area will suffer a
major failure.
Environment Rules The Environment rules have a similar arrangement. The En-
vironmental Assessor tabulates the number of sensors which have performance readings
outside the limits. If it is essential equipment such as a pressure transducer, the loss will
cause a functional area loss. If it is non-mission essential equipment, the loss will only
cause a minor degradation to the environment functional area.
Special Mission Rules While basic AUV maneuvering control and navigation will
be the primary focus for some time, incorporation of specialized missions will eventually
become important. Specialized Mission rules have a different influence than the previous
functional areas. Most of these rules do not take effect until the transition to a special
mission configuration at the conclusion of the transit. The exception to this is a special
mission area equipment failure. A functional mission area failure occurs if the special
mission equipment fails. It is desirable to have an alternative to undertake a secondary
mission if the primary mission cannot be fulfilled. The specialized rules are usually
mission-dependent. There are no special mission rules in the present version of the
Mission Executor.
5 Implementation
A prototype Mission Executor has been implemented using the expert system shell CLIPS
version 5.0 [6], chosen for its wide availability (can be obtained at minimal cost), high
portability (comes with source code written in C and can easily be modified), and flexi-
bility (can easily be integrated with other programming languages or external systems).
CLIPS was developed by NASA and has been used in the construction of both real-time
and non-real-time systems. It is a forward-chaining, rule based software tool that provides
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many desirable features including list processing, production system type of reasoning,
and object oriented computing.
5.1 Main Algorithm
The vehicle reasoning system is initialized upon the download of the mission plan. This
triggers the rule Mission .Timer, which continually binds the mission time to the current
central processing unit (cpu) time. A timer flag is continually asserted in this rule and
retracted in the timer manager rule. The timer manager continually asserts facts which
trigger other polling rules. The initial state of mission_status is continue_un restricted which
will remain the same through the duration of the mission as long as no functional area
becomes critical or experiences failure. Most of the rules in the Mission Executor are to
handle missions which cannot remain in the ideal state due to a casualty or discrepancy
in the mission, vehicle, or environmental worlds. The main algorithm can be described
as follows:
download mission plan;
if vehicle.status = operational, then
process mission_f ile;
set mission.status to continue.unrestricted;
initialize mission.timer;
initialize all system objects;
loop: do while mission_status not in
[mission_complete, abort_to_rendezvous, abort.f or.recovery]
continuously update mission.time;
if the mission.time = time for some event, then
perform the event;
continuously feed waypoints to Guidance subsystem;
continuously monitor mission progress;
if an exception occurs, then
signal possible changes to Guidance, RePlanner;
access impact of changes;
reassign mission.status to different category if necessary;
end loop;
5.2 Object Representation
Input mission postures are first downloaded from the Mission Planner ofTboard the ve-
hicle. The input postures are given to the MissionJ nterpreter which places a posture
into the proper object format and designates the high-level classification of the posture
configuration as a transit or specialized mission.
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Vehicle internal state is modeled as a set of objects which represents all onboard
equipment that need to be monitored. They include:
• Power source: battery_1 and battery
_2;
• Control system: rudders, planes, propellers;
• Sonars: forward, left, right, bottom;
• Onboard computers: the Gespac 68030 computer, 386 PC;
• Navigation instrument: gyros, GPS;
• Environment sensors for water temperature and pressure.
Each object representing a piece of equipment has a default guard-line and red-line ranges
which, when violated, cause an alarm to be sent to the decision making levels. The
guard-line value exists to provide the equipment to degrade more gracefully, by initiating
the turn-key operation to energize redundant equipment or power source. The red-line
reading (either high or low) indicates the failure point or equipment shutdown limit
(naturally, not all equipment or power sources have both high and low limits). The
reading of object values is done by a polling rule, monitor_health_continuously which sends
for a message at regular intervals from the Mission Executor. If the value exceeds the
guard-line value, then the Mission Executor places the system being monitored in the
condition of critical. If the sensor red-line value is exceeded, the equipment is assumed
to have failed. In the case of a vehicle control system such as the rudder or diving planes,
there is also a message handler which checks the response of the system. This often
means positional response. For example, if the autopilot generates a command to turn
left and the rudder moves in a wrong direction, then the system is assumed to have
become critical.
Objects are used to model not only equipments, but also decisions which are main-
tained for the purposes of later retrieval in reconstructing the mission and in conducting
any possible machine learning for AUV II. Maintaining decisions is useful not only for
mission documentation, but also in resolving conflicts between states.
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5.3 Layering of Rules
The rules in the Mission Executor are layered in three levels of reasoning. The lowest-
level rules actually carry out the corrective action by ordering Guidance to turn, ascend
to safe depth. These rules are assumed to be competent operators or controllers. For
example, the maneuvering rule abnormaLdive is given the responsibility to order Guidance
to decrease the speed and ascend to the designated safe depth, bringing the vessel to a
safe configuration before it propagates this situation to the intermediate level assessment
rule.
The intermediate level consists of assessment rules from functional areas. For example,
the Maneuvering_Status_Assessment rule evaluates various types of maneuvering status
problems, and tabulates the number of deficiencies. Since the overall mission status is
dependent on rapid propagation of changes from the assessment rules, the assessment
rules are given a higher salience value to avoid being in conflict with lower level rules.
Assigning a higher salience value to the assessment rules gives them adequate priority.
At the highest level, the Overall_Mission_Assessor examines the current status of all
functional areas and makes a determination on the state of the vehicle mission. At that
point, the overall mission status is changed, if necessary, and the results propagated down
to the respective mission abort or mission restricted rules. All of the functional areas
have a similar structure. Maneuvering has the added feature of low level assessment rules
which examine the obstacle object base to see if the indicated obstacles pose a collision
danger.
5.4 Maintaining a Consistent Knowledge Base
As important as sensing data and scheduling actions is the maintenance of consistency
in the knowledge base. In a rule-based system this becomes acutely important when the
generation of a new action through a control fact is based on some other events. If the
events that would cause the action are no longer valid, then it may be the case that the
generated control fact is no longer valid. In such a case it will be necessary to remove
the fact. This truth maintenance is an integral part of the Mission Executor, mostly in
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the highest levels. The vehicle's initial state (hence ideal state) rests upon a foundation
of all functional areas being operational (this does not mean that all functional areas
are devoid of any complications; it only means that the complications will not cause the
vehicle to become critical).
Any failure of a particular functional area will cause the mission status to be changed.
The Mission Executor does this by retracting the mission status of continue_un restricted
and asserting a new status of abort_mission. It results in vehicle recovery or an abort
transit to the designated rendezvous. The abort status is one that should remain in effect
until the vehicle is recovered. This is so since abort_mission should only take place when
all relevant options to continue the mission have been explored and found unexecutable.
However, in the interval between the status change and the actual vehicle recovery,
there is the possibility that a functional area becoming critical could later attempt to
cause the status of continue_with_restrictions. There is also the possibility that the func-
tional area recovery rules could cause the new state of continue_unrestricted. To counter
any possibility that either of these could happen, a truth maintenance feature of status
lock is incorporated. This causes the mission assessor rule to be removed. Thus, no
mission state change can occur and overall mission status becomes "frozen"
.
5.5 Managing Uncertainty
Uncertainty plays a significant role in the Mission Executor. In fact the primary reason
for using a forward-chaining rule based tool such as CLIPS is that there is a great deal of
uncertainty about the external environment. What is known about the environment can
best be classified in heuristics. A specific area of uncertainty that the Mission Executor
must reason about is the presence of obstacles. Reporting an obstacle at short range
automatically generates a command from the Mission Executor (an emergency situation)
but reporting an obstacle at the limit of the sonar is a different matter. The obstacle
is assigned a confidence factor which comes from the Sonax Processing Suite. If the
confidence factor is high to medium and the obstacle is within the 180 degree arc about
the bow of the AUV, then the obstacle is considered to be a collision danger. This will
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cause the path to be replanned. The rationale is that the farther away an obstacle is
detected, the less radical a turn is necessary, often resulting in less deviation from the
original track, saving both mission time and energy consumption.
The confidence factor is checked whenever an obstacle alert flag is sent, be it an
update or a new obstacle. This feature helps to maintain the high level configuration
while still allowing for the necessary actions of avoiding obstacles and performing routine
navigation enroute to the mission origin or designated rendezvous.
5.6 Mission Documentation
There is a vital need for documentation ofAUV missions. Most AUV projects have come
to rely on some data recorded onboard the AUV. The compilation of data is valuable for
several reasons:
• It can be analyzed by human researchers to update and refine the AUV control
systems (both hardware and software).
• It can provide an idea of what works with rule-based systems and where failure in
reasoning occurs.
• It can be used as a persistent base of knowledge for "training" AUV's in situation
assessment.
Documentation already exists within the NPS AUV II baseline system in the form of
the Environmental Database which contains navigational data and data about obstacles
which might be encountered. A mission log is maintained by the Navigator module in
much the same way as a mission log is kept by a navigator of a maritime vessel. However,
in order to adequately study high level control, a mission log must also be kept of high
level decisions. It can be regarded as a form of captain's log which records the state of
the mission at the highest level and justifications for decisions made. At a standard time
interval or whenever the overall mission decision changes, an entry is made to the log.
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6 Simulation
A set of five simulation scenarios was designed to determine if the Mission Executor can
perform the high-level symbolic reasoning that generates the desired decisions for AUV
operation. We would also like to know whether the reasoning system could recognize
situations and try to approximate real-time constrained decision-making. Navigational
waypoints used in the simulation were based on the model of the Naval Postgraduate
School pool. An average mission time of two to four minutes was used for each scenario.
The simulations were run on a Sun Sparcstation 1.
6.1 Scenarios and Results
Scenario one tested the most basic case, pre-planned mission execution monitoring (that
is, waypoint sequencing). The AUV II was given a set of waypoints, each with its
specified estimated time of arrival as a constraint. At the third waypoint, the vehi-
cle missed its time constraint by 47 seconds, longer than the predefined tolerance level
of 40 seconds, and enough to cause the Waypoint_DistanceTime_Check rule to alert the
Navigation^ssessment rule. This resulted in a command to increase speed, but no
change in navigation status, since one violation of this kind is not considered critical
(the Navigation_Assessment rule employs a heuristic for replanning if four navigation
problems have occurred). In this scenario, it took 0.28 seconds for the Mission Ex-
ecutor to recognize the large navigational discrepancy in time (basically the work of
Waypoint_DistanceTime_Check rule). It took the Navigation Assessment rule 0.16 seconds
to determine that there was no need to change the status. The overall elapsed mission
time was 3 minutes 21 seconds with 16936 rules fired.
Scenario two tested the ability of the Mission Executor to recognize an untenable
obstacle avoidance situation. Both short-range obstacles and long-range obstacles were
tested. The first recognition of an obstacle close aboard led to an ascent to safe-depth.
This also tested a rule recognizing possible shoaling or grounding of the vessel. The
emergency avoidance maneuver rule began its time check of the avoidance maneuver.
An obstacle detected at long range led to assessment of the obstacle as threatening to
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the AUV. The overall maneuvering status was changed to continue_with_restrictions. At
one point enough obstacles had accumulated to cause the Collective_Obstacle_Assessment
rule to characterize the situation as involving a critical number of obstacles (the criterion
is four separate encounters). Later the same rule determined that the critical point
had been breached by the accumulation of too many obstacles along the track (the
heuristic is based on the reasoning that too many obstacles will cause too many time-
consuming avoidance maneuvers). The Maneuvering_Status_Assessment rule determined
that this was a functional area failure, resulting in an abort-mission situation. From
recognition of the critical point at 50.45 seconds into the mission, it took approximately
6.55 seconds to recognize the undesirable situation. The change in the maneuvering
status and subsequent overall assessment of the mission resulted in a time of propagation
of 0.14 seconds. The overall elapsed mission time was 1 minute 57 seconds with 8610
rules fired.
Scenario three involved a vehicle control system failure. After passing several way-
points, the AUV experienced an electrical failure of diving planes which triggered the
rule Maneuvering_Equipment_Failure first. The Control_System_Failure rule fired shortly
after that, leading to the overall mission assessment that this was an abort situation.
From the instantiation of the triggering event until the time it was recognized as an
abort situation was an interval of 0.24 seconds. Propagation of the maneuvering status
or equipment status to the Overall_Mission_Assessor was difficult to absolutely determine
because of the fact that both maneuvering assessment and equipment status assessment
fired. Either one could have caused the overall mission status to change. Because of the
high salience of both rules, activation of the OveralI_Mission_Assessor occurred only 0.17
seconds after the Equipment_Status_Assessment rule fired. The overall elapsed mission
time was 41 seconds with 2500 rules fired.
Scenario four evaluated both obstacle avoidance and environmental phenomena. Only
two obstacle encounters were realized, resulting in only minor deviations to the planned
navigational track. A significant environmental phenomenon was simulated by having
readings in all three environmental sensors exceeding allowable limits. This resulted in a
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mission abort. After the time of the triggering event, it took the Overall_Mission_Assessor
0.56 seconds to recognize that it was an abort situation. The overall elapsed mission time
was 2 minutes 11 seconds with 11200 rules fired.
Scenario five tested multiple equipment failures. The AUV passed through several
waypoints missing only one time constraint. A sonar failure (forward sonar) led to a
reduction in the overall mission status to continue_with .restrictions as the sonar went to
a critical state. A second sonar (right port sonar) led to a reinforcement of that state.
Failure of the rudder finally led to the AUV surfacing and energizing its transponder.
From the triggering event until the decision to abort, 0.47 seconds elapsed. The overall
elapsed mission time was 1 minute 15 seconds with 5456 rules fired.
6.2 Evaluation
Comparison of the results reveals that propagation of status from the functional area
assessors to the Overall_Mission .Assessor will probably meet real-time constraints in the
relatively slow-moving environment of the AUV in its testing facility. The true time
dependency does appear to be in the low-level action or assessment rules. Situation
recognition depends on good heuristics.
The use of a layered situation-based reasoning system appears to be sound. By using
an intermediate level assessment rule, the desired rapid reaction can be taken at the low-
level and the assessment of functional state can proceed at the same time. Thus, there
need not be a salience assigned to every level. Refinement of heuristics will certainly be
necessary to further optimize the rule base.
7 Conclusions
We have designed and developed a prototype Mission Executor for the AUV II, the au-
tonomous underwater vehicle that has been fabricated at the Naval Postgraduate School.
This not only provides a high level, intelligent software control for the AUV II, but also
allows for the encoding of domain specific heuristics into a rule base. We believe that the
essence of the expert knowledge of a submarine captain regarding maneuvering, avoid-
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ance of uncharted obstacles, waypoint navigation, and reaction to emergencies has been
adequately captured and implemented in our prototype system. We have also identified
the major data flows between the AUV II software components and defined the interrupt
commands for the Guidance subsystem.
While it is impossible to test all possible scenarios, the testing and debugging of the
Mission Executor, implemented in CLIPS version 5.0, illustrates its rapid prototyping
capabilities and the great utility of objects to represent the onboard systems and deci-
sions. Rules for newly-envisioned situations can be added with relative ease. Thus, the
prototype is easily extensible. This also means that current rules can be further refined
with more test runs in submarine maneuvering.
Through simulations, we have demonstrated that the Mission Executor is able to
react to adverse situations in a timely manner and to make informed decisions for AUV
maneuvering. We plan to install it onto the AUV II when the current development of
other software modules is completed.
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